Lectern

By Steve Kelman

Blog archive

The Lectern: Sign of a government source-selection failure?

There was widespread dismay in the contracting community when the Government Accountability Office sustained Boeing's protest of the Air Force's award of the tanker contract to EADS/Northrup Grumman. Given the high visibility of this procurement, the general assumption was that the Air Force would clearly get the source selection right.

The sustainment of the protest produced a worry of the form, "If the government can't do a source selection that meets GAO muster on a procurement of this degree of visibility, how can we expect it to do source selection right on procurements that are of lower visibility?" The sustainment of the protest was presented in much of the media, such as The Washington Post, as a sign of government incompetence or of crisis in the procurement workforce.

Vern Edwards has written a very interesting and persuasive commentary in the new issue of the trade publication The Government Contractor, questioning this reasoning. Edwards is a prolific and intelligent commentator on contracting issues; I don't always agree with him, but he is always worth paying attention to.

Basically, Edwards' argument is that the source selection criteria for major weapons systems contracts are so voluminous and complex that it is virtually inevitable some mistakes will be made. The GAO found seven. Edwards' point -- although he doesn't put it in quite these words -- is that there were probably hundreds and hundreds of factors and subfactors that had to be evaluated in detailed
ways. Amidst the blizzard of paper the source selection process produced, a few problems didn't get caught.

In the past, source selection decisions on major weapons systems have seldom been protested. Protests on earlier source selection decisions, Edwards surmises, would have produced a similar pattern of needle in a haystack errors that probably also would have led to those decisions being overturned. It's not necessarily that government can't do source selection right -- it may be that nobody can do the kind of source selection used on major defense systems right. (It may be noted that one impact of 1990's procurement reforms was to move away from these massive, overly complex source selections in areas outside weapons systems -- so that source selection for IT has become simpler. Before the 1990's reforms, all government was subject to the problems Edwards describes for weapons systems.)

Edwards' lesson from all this makes sense. The source selection process itself is too complex. It is an accident waiting to happen.

Edwards thinks that, perhaps, given how close these tankers are to commercial items, the Air Force should have subsidized some development work by the two teams and just done a fly-off -- an approach, in my view, the government should consider more in an IT context as well.

One might also ask -- and I wonder how GAO would react to this suggestion -- whether GAO is asking for impossible standards of perfection from these complex source selections, the way the General Services Board of Contract Appeals used to do in the bad old days for IT procurements.

Posted by Steve Kelman on Jul 02, 2008 at 9:41 AM


Reader comments

Tue, Jul 8, 2008 Michael Lent

Steve, thanks. I agree, mostly. These really are almost commercial platforms, and they nearly exist in flyable form. A flyoff would be great. An act of bureaucratic prudence, if not an innovation. Unclear why AF shunned this approach as it does for fighters.However, between the dimensions, acq process and complexity of the factors/subfactors set, I can't see the problem. Have not read the RFP (tried, but can't get it), but frankly the eval scheme--from the longest descriptions in defense trade pubs--sounds less complex than some IT systems and SI RFPs, e.g., NMCI. Sure, process could be simplified, but that requires more trust--more among govt-side players than between govt and sources. The AF has no good excuse for botching the process. Section M-responsive proposal content shouldn't have blinded, confused, or derailed evaluators. Probably not needles in a haystack; most props are written to highlight boldly responses to the RFP's Sec. M mandates. Am concerned about building a lame but plausible "out" to fit just about any situation so that we never get responsibility or accountability. I am a strong believer in the 80 percent solution, but the AF gave us acq system failure. If the GWOT were WWII, those tankers would be rolling off the line in 6 months or less.

Mon, Jul 7, 2008 Tom Colangelo

Michael,I totally agree with your position. I expect the AF used some of their top people to execute this source selection and there should have been no basis for protest. At the same time, I reiterate that capability has been degraded, and that degradation is not limited to our most junior people; it applies to most of the acquisition workforce and probably includes the executors of the tanker source selection, as well as its senior reviewers and acquisition leadership. This is not a knock on the acquisition workforce. They are a highly educated, enthusiastic, and dedicated group of people, and most of our interns during the 1990’s and early 2000s have been outstanding. However, many were (and are being) short-changed in development either by the local working situation or their desires to advance quickly. Given difficulty in filling positions, many of our activities have advanced people before they were ready to avoid losing them. With current workloads, I would not expect the situation to begin correcting itself until the workforce is sized to be compatible with current business systems and processes. We also need to find the right balance between insight and oversight and tailor these processes based on current capability.

Mon, Jul 7, 2008 John Monroe

Michael, I think that Vern Edwards' point -- which I find persuasive -- is that it is easy to look at those 7 issues, say "Omigod," and think about how big or visible they are, but that if you look at all the factors and subfactors in an extremely complex weapons procurement, they begin to look more like needles in a haystack.The innovation that could have averted this disaster -- and again I'm following Edwards' point, which I find persuasive -- is to make the source selection process for these major weapons systems less complex, and where possible (such as here, in Edwards' view) to rely more on fly-offs and less on essay writing contests.Steve

Thu, Jul 3, 2008 Michael Lent

tripper6: your thoughts sound right--for a business-as-usual set of conditions. Problem is, this acquisition was not BAU. Everyone from the (recently canned) SECAF on down knew this one required the best people, the best management and oversight, with whatever support was necessary. Payton painted such a picture. Extraordinary measures were to be taken. Yet the result was a bust of boggling ineptitude. As a set, the 7 errors sound like gross sloppiness and incompetence, not a plot to pick NG/EADS. The work can be re-done, much faster, and much better. As we're only the children or grandchildren of the Greatest Generation, the AF just might have to pretend we are at war and act with urgency. The govt might need to adopt the ole WWII spirit that's been lacking in what some in government and its contractors have been expected to do in the GWOT. It's a national condition, not just in the government sphere. To recover from this one egregious case, the people concerned directly can all dig deeper and get the buy done properly. And let's see if Gates lets accountability disappear into the ether. Actually, he should take over this acquisition from the AF. Those KC-135s really are old.

Thu, Jul 3, 2008 Michael Lent

The seven faults were hardly technicalities or needles in a haystack. They are bold mistakes and very visible, even though Sue Payton had crowed that, "We got it nailed," referring to the purported high quality of the AF job in this acquisition. The word that comes to mind is incompetence, or perhaps something stronger. Steve, I was wondering what your reaction would be to this disaster. Is there any way that "innovation" could have saved the day? Is there any unfair "gotcha" factor in the Fear Industry's reaction to this? Please give us the benefit of your views.

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